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migrants. With asymmetric preferences, migration competition takes place in income support 
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unilateral ‘migration-purchase’ policies. 
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 1 Introduction
Immigration is a prevalent policy issue in many countries. The creation of the European
Union (EU) and, in particular, the 1992 Single Market Initiative have lowered the costs of
migration among EU member states. The recent EU Eastern Enlargement has contributed
to this trend and has led to non-negligible migration ﬂows to core EU member states.1 Simi-
larly, immigration in the United States (US) and, in particular, low-skilled immigration from
Mexico is signiﬁcant in scale and the associated economic and ﬁscal consequences are con-
troversially debated in US politics.2 Migration ﬂows do not leave public policies unaﬀected.
Most notably, migration and tax-transfer systems are inherently intertwined. Migrants decide
on the country of residence also with an eye to how generous social assistance payments are
and how heavily the government taxes market incomes.3 This provides incentives for gov-
ernments to compete in these ﬁscal instruments to attract beneﬁcial migrants and to limit
undesirable welfare migration.4
This paper provides an analysis of how governments behave in ﬁscal competition for
migrants. In particular, it not only characterizes the level of taxes and transfers and their
eﬃciency implications (as in previous literature), but also in which of the two ﬁscal variables
governments compete for migrants. Competition in taxes or transfers arises endogenously
in our analysis and the precise form of competition depends on which interest dominates
government policy-making. We show that when governments have symmetric preferences,
presenting the interest of either high-income or low-income households living within their
jurisdictions, then countries compete in taxes. Albeit the equilibrium mode of competition
is identical for the two policy objectives, the economic incentives underlying the result in
1See, e.g., Dustmann, Frattini and Halls (2010) for an evaluation of immigration ﬂows from the recent
EU accession countries to the United Kingdom (UK). The share of immigrants from accession countries as a
proportion of the UK working-age population increased from 0.01 per cent to 1.3 per cent by the beginning
of 2009. As to stocks of immigrants, Peri (2008) reports that immigrants as a share of the native population
are on average 5 per cent for EU15 countries. The corresponding numbers for classical immigration countries
are 27.5 per cent (Australia), 19.1 per cent (Canada), 23 per cent (Switzerland), and 13.5 per cent (US).
2See Borjas and Katz (2007) and Chiquiar and Hanson (2005) for a discussion of the eﬀects of immigration
on the US economy.
3Empirical evidence on welfare-induced migration is provided in Borjas (1999), Gelbach (2004), McKinnish
(2007), Fiva (2009) and Peri (2009), among others.
4Migration competition links tax and transfer levels across jurisdictions. For instance, Figlio, Kolpin and
Reid (1999) and Saavedra (2000) estimate the interdependence of welfare beneﬁts among US states. They
ﬁnd that welfare beneﬁts are positively related to the beneﬁt levels in neighboring states. This is consistent
with the notion that migration provides a downward pressure on welfare spending. See Brueckner (2000) for
a review of the literature, also summarizing estimates of earlier empirical studies for the US.
2the two cases are diametrically distinct. While a government that focuses on the interest
of high-income households chooses income taxes as its strategic variable in order to make
transfer policy in the neighboring countries less generous, a government that focuses on low-
income households competes in income taxes to raise the amount of per-capita transfers
in neighboring countries. Diﬀerently, when countries pursue distinct policy objectives, the
equilibrium prediction is that countries compete in transfers. We further show that the
results are robust to whether high-skilled or low-skilled households are mobile and to whether
migration is costly, as long as moving costs are not prohibitively high.
Clarifying which type of competition governments opt for is helpful in precisely predict-
ing the redistributive and eﬃciency eﬀects of migration competition. In particular, the two
endogenously arising modes of competition give rise to distinct policy implications. For
instance, tax and transfer competition impair eﬃciency of policy choices diﬀerently. Un-
derstanding the type of competition is hence crucial for the design of corrective policies,
which e.g. federal governments devise for lower-level governments that compete for migrants.
Transfer competition will lead to larger inter-state ﬁscal externalities. The matching rate of
the Pigouvian grant should correspondingly be adjusted compared with tax competition to
prevent an ‘under-correction’ of externalities. Further, absent a central authority, countries
may adopt unilateral policies to control migration. These policies might become ineﬀective
in inﬂuencing migration ﬂows when policy makers erroneously judge the form of competition
in which neighboring countries engage. For instance, high-income countries might voluntarily
pay transfer to low-income countries in order to limit low-skilled migration.5 As shown in the
paper, such ‘migration-purchase’ policies may be perceived to be neutral for migration ﬂows
provided the low-income country competes in transfers. In this case, the receiving county
may use the inﬂow of transfers to lower taxes on rich households. Incomes of low-income
households will most likely not change and so do their incentives to migrate. It is only when
the receiving country competes in taxes that transfers to low-income households might be
conjectured to rise in order to balance the budget. Incentives to migrate will be diluted, as
intended by the unilateral transfer policy.
5For instance, transfer payments between EU member states might be interpreted in this vein. EU struc-
tural funds are intended to increase per-capita income in low-income regions in the EU, see Boldrin and
Canova (2003). Thereby, the funds potentially limit migration ﬂows to high-income regions. The same type of
reasoning likely applies to equalization transfers within a federation (such as Australia, Canada and Germany,
for instance) and, more broadly, to development aid. See, e.g., Myers (1990) for a theoretical treatment of
voluntary ‘migration-purchase’ policies.
3The issue of how migration inﬂuences policy choices is widely analyzed in the literature.
Existing studies focus on the eﬀect of migration on the level of taxes and transfers and the
associated redistributive and eﬃciency implications (e.g., Epple and Romer, 1991; Wildasin,
1991; Cremer and Pestieau, 1998; Hindriks, 1999; Razin, Sadka and Swagel, 2002 and Pout-
vaara, 2007).6 The literature does not analyze the type of competition governments opt for
by assuming that governments compete in either taxes or transfers. Wildasin (1989) and
Koethenbuerger (2011) look at the type of competition governments engage in. However,
they do not lean themselves to the behavior of governments in the presence of migration, the
inherent role of preference (a)symmetries and to how strategic behavior may undermine the
eﬀectiveness of well-established policy tools.7
The observation that the policy objective of governments matters for the structure of
ﬁscal policies and the induced migration outcomes conforms with previous literature. For
instance, Mansoorian and Myers (1997) show that the eﬃciency of migration competition
depends on which metric the government uses in evaluating ﬁscal policies.8 The implications
of the governments’ policy objectives for the type of ﬁscal competition (tax vs. transfer
competition) have not been established yet.
Cremer and Pestieau (1998) and Cremer and Goul˜ ao (2011) analyze competition in social
insurance systems when beneﬁts might be uniform (Beveridgean system) or related to income
(Bismarckian system). They assume that taxes are strategically set and transfers adjust
residually. Interestingly, they look into the strategic choice of the type of social insurance
(Beveridgean vs. Bismarckian). For instance, Cremer and Goul˜ ao (2011) show that when
a government is only interested in insuring low-income households against income shocks, it
may strategically choose to deviate from the straightforward choice of a Bismarckian system
and may opt for a Beveridgean system. The papers diﬀer from this analysis in terms of the
dimension of migration competition that is endogenously chosen by jurisdictions. We focus
on the choice between tax and transfer competition.
The paper shows how governments try to make their countries more or less attractive
as a migration magnet. It thereby sheds light on one dimension of how governments try to
6See Cremer and Pestieau (2004) for a review of the literature.
7Wildasin (1989) analyzes the type of ﬁscal competition when capital is mobile. Wildasin adopts a repre-
sentative household framework, as common in the capital tax competition literature. Koethenbuerger (2011)
equally adopts a representative agent model. Diﬀerent to Wildasin, Koethenbuerger assumes that resources
are immobile.
8Boadway (2004) provides a discussion of the literature.
4get a competitive advantage over other countries. The policy is presumably complementary
to other policies that countries strategically use in international competition, such as trade
policy, for instance. However, the structure of government incentives underlying the ﬁndings
is qualitatively diﬀerent to that known from strategic trade policy (Brander, 1995). When
adopting strategic trade policy by, e.g., granting export subsidies, a country shifts the best
responses of its domestic ﬁrms, just to gain a competitive advantage vis-` a-vis foreign ﬁrms.
In our setting, a country strategically manipulates the other countries’ policy best responses
when choosing how to compete for migrants.9
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the basic model, followed by a
characterization of government behavior, for a given type of migration competition, in Section
3. Section 4 analyzes the endogenous emergence of tax or transfer competition, and Section
5 discusses extensions of the basic model. Section 6 provides a discussion of the ﬁndings.
Finally, Section 7 summarizes the results and draws some concluding remarks.
2 Model
We set up a canonical model of migration. Consider two potentially asymmetric jurisdictions.
There are high-income and low-income households in both jurisdictions. Each household
supplies a ﬁxed amount of labor that is normalized at unity. High-income households in
jurisdiction i receive a wage wh
i and pay taxes Ti. Diﬀerently, low income households earn
a wage income wl
i and receive a public transfer payment zi. Output in each jurisdiction is




i denote the number of high-
income and low-income households that reside in jurisdiction i. The production function has
constant returns to scale and exhibits a positive and declining marginal productivity of the
two inputs. Both inputs are thereby complements in production.
We start out with the assumption that low-income households are mobile between the
two jurisdictions while high-income households are immobile. Low-income households migrate
until their gross income is equalized, i.e. wl
1 + z1 = wl
2 + z2.10 The migration equilibrium
9In existing studies of migration competition (adhering to tax or transfer competition), changes in the level
of ﬁscal variables do not shift policy best responses. Instead, countries ‘move along’ the other countries’ policy
best responses when altering their own policy.
10The arbitrage condition implies that households do not migrate into the welfare state. They are integrated
into the labor market. For instance, Dustmann, Frattini and Halls (2010) document that in the UK migrants
from the recent EU accession countries are on average more skilled than the UK workforce and do not have
lower labor force participation rates than natives. Further, the migration arbitrage condition assumes that
5condition and the migration ﬂow condition dll
i + dll









A more generous transfer payment in jurisdiction i incentivizes low-income households to
migrate from jurisdiction j to jurisdiction i. Given our assumption about mobility, we may
set lh
i = 1 without loss of generality. Low-income households receive a competitive wage in




i = fi()   wl
ill
i: (2)
The output share wh
i might also be interpreted as income accruing to some ﬁxed, non-labor
inputs that are supplied by high-income households, such as land. Taxes and transfer pay-
ments are linked via the budget constraint
Ti = zill
i: (3)
Each jurisdiction non-cooperatively decides on the level of its taxes and transfer payments.
The government chooses the policy instruments so as to maximize the well-being of the
immobile households that is determined by the income level yh
i = wh
i   Ti. The view may
be motivated by the stronger incentives of immobile households to shape political decisions
since their well-being is more closely tied to the jurisdiction in which they live. Also, turnout
rates are found to be higher for high-income households. Later on, we will account for the
possibility that low-income households determine policy incentives. Conceptually, both views
might also be borne out of a political environment in which the median voter (either high-
income or low-income) is politically decisive. See Epple and Romer (1991), Cremer and
Pestieau (1998), and Razin, Sadka and Swagel (2002), for instance.
Each jurisdiction has the two instruments Ti and zi at its disposal, but can only decide
on one instruments while the other instrument adjusts so as to balance the public budget
(3). As it will turn out, deciding on taxes or transfers leads to diﬀerent income levels for
high-income households and the government thus prefers one over the other. In the following
we characterize the choice of the instrument with which governments compete for migrants.
To this end, we allow for the following sequence of decisions:
migrants have access to the tax-transfer system of the destination country as natives have. This corresponds
to the eligibility rules that apply to native households that migrate within the EU and the US, for instance.
6Stage 1: Jurisdictions simultaneously choose whether to chooses taxes or transfers in
competition.
Stage 2: Jurisdictions simultaneously choose the level of the policy variable chosen at the
ﬁrst stage.
Stage 3: Low-income households decide to migrate and ﬁrms choose labor demand.
Stage 4: Production takes place, wages fwh
i ;wl
igi=1;2 are paid, taxes fTigi=1;2 are col-
lected, transfers fzigi=1;2 are paid out to households, and households consume.
We solve the game backwards to characterize a subgame-perfect equilibrium (in pure
strategies) in the choice of the strategic policy instruments.
3 Implications of diﬀerent modes of competition
Given the two strategies a jurisdiction can use to compete for migrants, we can distinguish
between four policy regimes. For instance, in a (Ti;Tj)-regime both jurisdictions strategically
choose the tax rate to compete with each other. In such an environment, jurisdiction i chooses





i   Ti s.t. (1);(2) and (3); (4)























   
   
dTj=0
(6)
is the change in the number of low-income households in jurisdiction i. The tax rate choice
balances the marginal eﬀect migration has on the wage income of high-income households and
the ﬁscal costs these households have to bear at the margin. The migration response ΩijdTj=0
includes the direct eﬀect of a higher transfer payment zi and the repercussion that follows
from the migration-induced response in jurisdiction j’s transfer payment. In particular, a
more generous transfer payment in jurisdiction i reduces the number of transfer recipients in
jurisdiction j. Since jurisdiction i perceives jurisdiction j to keep the tax rate constant, the
budgetary adjustment is conjectured to take place on the expenditure side in form of a rise




   
dTj=0
> 0. Formally, the term follows
from diﬀerentiating the budget constraint (3) (re-indexed to j) for a given tax rate Tj, while
taking the migration ﬂow (1) into account. Thus,
dzj
dzi
   

























The overall migration ﬂow to jurisdiction i is positive, reﬂecting the second-order nature of
the budgetary repercussion in jurisdiction j and its eﬀect on migration.






, captures the rise in transfer pay-
ments in response to a higher tax rate. Totally diﬀerentiating (3), using the migration ﬂow
condition (1) and noting the budgetary adjustment (7), which a policy change in jurisdiction


























      
=Ωi|dTj=0
> 0: (9)
The bracketed term in the denominator equals the total migration ﬂow in response to the
transfer change in the two jurisdictions, ΩijdTj=0. Following (8), the migration response is
positive, implying that zi and Ti are positively related.
In a (zi;Tj)-regime, jurisdiction i chooses the transfer payment directly and the tax rate
residually follows from the budget constraint (3). Formally, the tax rate change dTi
dzi
   
 
dTj=0
is the inverse of (9). Hence, the ﬁrst-order condition for zi is (5) multiplied by the residual
variation in the tax rate, dTi
dzi
 
   
dTj=0
. It becomes evident that condition (5) still describes
optimal policy. Conditional on the tax rate Tj, tax-transfer policy in jurisdiction i is thus
independent of whether jurisdiction i chooses to compete in taxes or transfers.
Jurisdiction i’s policy choice will change when the neighboring jurisdiction competes in
transfers rather than taxes. For instance, in a (Ti;zj)-regime jurisdiction i chooses its tax
















dzi is the migration ﬂow associated with a higher transfer payment in
jurisdiction i. Diﬀerent to the migration response ΩijdTj=0 in the ﬁrst-order condition (5), the
response only includes the direct eﬀect of a rise in zi. An outﬂow of migrants in jurisdiction j
reduces expenditures in that region. Unlike in the (Ti;Tj)-regime, jurisdiction j balances the
budget by lowering the tax rate rather than increasing transfer payments. The adjustment
leaves the migration ﬂow unaﬀected. In fact, given that jurisdiction j will not try to keep some
of the low-income households by raising the transfer payment, more low-income households
will migrate to jurisdiction i and increase the gross income of high-income households in this
jurisdiction, i.e.
Ωijdzj=0 > ΩijdTj=0 : (11)
As such, when facing a jurisdiction that ﬁxes transfer payments, jurisdiction i ﬁnds it more
beneﬁcial to attract migrants through ﬁscal policy. As captured by the third term in (10), a
counteracting incentive eﬀect is that tax revenues have to be shared among more migrants
which implies that the rise in jurisdiction i’s per-capita transfer zi in response to a hike
in its tax rate becomes more modest. Concretely, diﬀerentiating (3), while noting (1), and
comparing the resulting term with (9) yields
dzi
dTi
   





   










The more modest transfer rise dilutes incentives to compete for migrants, c.f. conditions (5)
and (10). The diluting eﬀect, however, is a consequence of the migration response diﬀerential
(11) and, thereby, is a second-order eﬀect. It attenuates the impact of the migration ﬂow
diﬀerential (11) on policy incentives, but does not oﬀset it.11
Finally, when jurisdiction i chooses the transfer payment strategically ((zi;zj)-regime),
the relevant ﬁrst-order condition is condition (10) multiplied by dTi
dzi
   
 
dzj=0
. The latter term
is the residual adjustment in the tax rate and is the inverse of the right-hand side of the
11Formally, using Ωijdzj=0 =
dll
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9inequality in (12). The ﬁrst-order condition naturally coincides with (10). For a given level
of zj, it provides identical policy incentives for the same reason as the two regimes (Ti;Tj)
and (zi;Tj) are equivalent for jurisdiction i in terms of policy incentives. Thus,
Proposition 1: (i) For a given choice of the policy variable in jurisdiction j, jurisdiction
i chooses the same tax-transfer policy in a (Ti;aj)-regime and in a (zi;aj)-regime, a 2 fT;zg.
(ii) In a (ai;zj)-regime, jurisdiction i is incentivized to choose a higher tax rate and transfer
payment compared with a (ai;Tj)-regime, a 2 fT;zg.
The intuition for part (i) is that, ﬁxing the strategic policy variable of jurisdiction j,
it is immaterial whether the rise in transfer payments zi follows directly from a rise in the
expenditure category or indirectly from budgetary adjustments in response to a rise in the
tax rate. It only matters in which variable the neighboring jurisdiction competes; c.f. part
(ii) of Proposition 1. The neighboring jurisdiction may exploit the interdependence when
choosing how to compete for migrants, as analyzed next.
4 Choosing how to compete
In analyzing the equilibrium choice of the strategic policy variable, we compare the income
level yh
i in the four policy regimes characterized in the last section. In particular, we analyze
whether, starting from one of the four regimes, a jurisdiction can increase the income of
the high-income population by changing the policy variable. In doing so, we solve for the
subgame-perfect equilibrium choice of the policy variable in which jurisdictions compete. In
the sequel, we assume existence, uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium at stage 2 of the
game which is associated with each of the four policy regimes.
First consider that jurisdiction j uses transfers as the strategic policy variable. When
jurisdiction i initially adopts the same policy variable, but switches to the tax rate Ti, ju-
risdiction j will ﬁnd it less beneﬁcial to compete for migrants and will reduce its transfer
payment, c.f. part (ii) of Proposition 1. Likewise, when jurisdiction j competes in taxes for
migrants, the switch by jurisdiction i will incentivize jurisdiction j to reduce the tax rate and
thereby its transfer payment to low-income households. In both cases, the change in income
yh
i , which is associated with the switch in jurisdiction i’s policy variable, is due to the drop






























is given by (7), re-indexed appropriately. The income change in (13) is
evaluated for a given tax rate Ti. Jurisdiction i sets the tax rate optimally and, thereby,
reacts optimally to the change in the amount of per-capita transfers zj. By an application
of the envelope theorem, jurisdiction i’s tax rate adjustment and the associated change in
transfers zi have no eﬀect on the change in income.
Using the migration ﬂow condition dll
i + dll






i ΩjjdTi=0 < 0: (14)
From (8), the income change is negative. High-income households thus beneﬁt from the
reduced transfer payment in the neighboring jurisdiction. It leads to an inﬂow of migrants
which increases their income. Since the incentive to choose the tax rate as the strategic
policy variable applies independently of the neighbor’s choice, jurisdictions have a dominant
strategy which is to compete in taxes.
Proposition 2: Consider that policy decisions are taken so as to maximize the income
of immobile, high-income households. Then, in a subgame-perfect equilibrium, jurisdictions
decide to compete in taxes for migrants.
Some comments are in order to show that using (14) is a valid strategy to characterize the
equilibrium mode of competition. First, as shown above, the income level yh
i is independent
of whether jurisdiction i competes in taxes or transfers, for a given level of the policy variable
of the neighboring jurisdiction (part (i) of Proposition 1). Thus, the change in jurisdiction
i’s policy variable has no eﬀect on income per-se. Income only changes through the induced
change in transfers in the neighboring jurisdiction, as captured by (14).
Second, the switch in jurisdiction i’s policy variable changes jurisdiction j’s ﬁrst-order
condition from (10) to (5). This implies a jump in the level of zj and correspondingly in
jurisdiction i’s tax-transfer policy and income level yh
i . Still, the marginal income change in








jurisdiction i’s best response 
jurisdiction j’s best response 
E0 
E1 
Figure 1: Best Responses.
1 illustrates the discrete jump in transfers when jurisdiction i switches its policy variable
from zi to Ti. The initial stage-2 equilibrium is point E0. The switch undermines jurisdiction
j’s incentive to spend on transfers which shifts its best-response function downwards and,
thereby, shifts the new equilibrium to point E1.12 Eq. (14) allows us to infer the change in
income yh
i when moving along jurisdiction i’s best response from the initial equilibrium E0 to
the new equilibrium E1. Precisely, (14) shows that the change in income when zj marginally
increases is negative. Since (14) holds at any point between E0 and E1, the total change in
income between both equilibrium points is positive.
As a ﬁnal remark, the change in transfer payments zj which we use to evaluate (14) is the
change that is directly implied by jurisdiction j’s change in policy incentives, for a given value
of zi. The change diﬀers from the total change in jurisdiction j’s transfer payments. The sign
of the direct change, however, is a suﬃcient statistic for the sign of the total change. More
concretely, the total change in zj can be decomposed into a change that directly follows from
the shift in the best-response function (transfer diﬀerence zj0  zj∗ in Figure 1) and one that
depends on how transfer payments of the two jurisdictions interact on the way to the new
equilibrium E1 (transfer diﬀerence zj∗   zj1). In Figure 1, the interaction eﬀect reinforces
12Note, given the conditional equivalence of jurisdiction i’s policy incentives (see part (i) of Proposition 1),
the locus of its best response is unaltered.
12the direct eﬀect and the sign of the direct eﬀect trivially predicts the sign of the total eﬀect.
More importantly, when the interaction eﬀect is opposite in sign, (14) still predicts the sign of
the total eﬀect. Since, by assumption, the equilibrium is stable, a counteracting interaction
eﬀect will attenuate, but not neutralize the direct eﬀect. Thus, independently of whether
transfers are strategic substitutes, as drawn in Figure 1, or strategic complements, the sign
of the total income change can be inferred from (14).
5 Extensions
Before turning to two extension in detail, we will brieﬂy mention two modiﬁcations that
are frequently considered in the literature and yield the same equilibrium outcome as in the
previous section.
Contrary to what we assume above, migration might be costly due to pecuniary costs
that are associated with migration or due to non-pecuniary costs that take the form of
psychological disutility from not living in the home country (e.g., Mansoorian and Myers,
1993). To the extent that migration costs are non-prohibitive, these considerations change
the magnitude of the migration response (1), but not the sign of the response. The latter
is crucial for the ﬁscal incentives in any of the four policy regimes and, in particular, for
the diﬀerential in policy choices across the regimes. As a consequence, Proposition 1 and 2
remain valid with this modiﬁcation.
One may equally envision a reversed pattern of household mobility than the one assumed
above. Depending on the economic environment, it might be the high-income households
that primarily migrate when compared with low-income households. To accommodate this
concern, we might swap the role of the two households types and assume that high-income
households migrate and that low-income households are immobile and decide on the level of
taxes and transfers. Since the basic model only distinguishes between two production fac-
tors that are complementary in production, the change in the pattern of household mobility
amounts to a re-interpretation of the model where high-income households become low-income
households and vice versa. Formally, this requires to adjust the income superscripts appro-
priately and to set zi =  Ti and, conversely, Ti =  zi. The equilibrium prediction of the
model is the same. The two jurisdictions compete in taxes.
135.1 Low-income households set government policy
Policy choices may primarily reﬂect the interest of low-income households. Although turnout
rates tend to be decreasing in income and resources needed to gain a suﬃciently strong polit-
ical representation of interests may be less readily available to low-income voters, they may
still outnumber high-income voters, thereby gaining a decisive inﬂuence on policy making.
In what follows, we assume that the government is interested in maximizing the income of
low-income households yl
i.13
The modiﬁcation of the model changes the objective function that the government uses
to select the level of taxes and transfers and to evaluate whether it prefers to strategically
set taxes or transfers. However, the migration ﬂow in response to policy changes, its impact
on wages and the budgetary implications of ﬁscal policy are qualitatively unaﬀected by the
change in government motivation. They still follow from (1), (2) and (3). Thus, jurisdiction




i + zi s.t. (1);(2) and (3); (15)








   
 
daj=0
= 0 , f
′′
i Ωijdaj=0 + 1 = 0: (16)
Condition (16) captures how tax policy and the associated migration ﬂow inﬂuence the wage
rate of the poor and transfers in jurisdiction i. Low-income households enjoy a higher transfer
payment, but have to accept a lower wage income due to more immigration. To analyze how
jurisdiction i’s policy incentives depend on jurisdiction j’s choice of policy variable, we can
make use of the migration responses in (11). Based on the response diﬀerential, the ﬁrst term
in (16) is larger when jurisdiction j chooses transfers (dzj = 0) rather than taxes (dTj = 0).
Thus, when jurisdiction j strategically chooses income taxes, the migration inﬂow does not
depress the wage income of the poor too much. As such, jurisdiction i has stronger incentives
to use tax-transfer policy when dTj = 0. This changes part (ii) of Proposition 1 to:14
13A recurrent political issue is whether immigrants are immediately granted voting rights and, thereby, to
what extent their interests inﬂuence policy-making. See, e.g., Michel, Pestieau and Vidal (1998). In the model
at hand, we could assume that a certain fraction of low-income households are natives that are entitled to
vote. Since their interest is aligned with the interest of immigrants, maximizing income of native, low-income
voters results in maximizing y
l
i.
14Part (i) of Proposition 1 extends to the modiﬁed government objective function. When jurisdiction i
14Proposition 3: Assume that each government maximizes the income of low-income
households living in its jurisdiction. In a (ai;zj)-regime, the government in jurisdiction i
chooses a lower tax rate and transfer payment compared with a (ai;Tj)-regime, a 2 fT;zg.
At stage 1 of the game, the two jurisdictions choose their policy variables non-cooperatively.
When both jurisdictions initially compete in transfers and jurisdiction i switches to taxes as
the policy variable, then, following Proposition 3, jurisdiction j chooses a higher level of taxes
and transfers. As before, the same change in jurisdiction j’s tax-transfer policy occurs when
jurisdiction j competes in taxes and jurisdiction i switches from transfers to taxes as the
policy variable.15 The induced change in income of low-income households in jurisdiction i






























The transfer adjustment changes the number of migrants which inﬂuences the wage income wl
i
(ﬁrst-term) and the transfer income of low-income household in jurisdiction i (second term),
for a given tax rate Ti. Note, any variation in Ti has no eﬀect on income at the margin which
is an implication of the envelope theorem. Using the migration ﬂow condition dll
i + dll
j = 0








   
   
dTi=0
> 0: (18)
From (8), the migration ﬂow to jurisdiction j is negative which implies wl
i to increase, as
depicted by the ﬁrst term in (18). Further, following (7), the transfer eﬀect is positive since
less transfer recipients share the same budget for transfers. Hence, the rise in zj boosts the
wage rate and leaves a higher level of transfers to low-income households in jurisdiction i.
Consequently, jurisdiction i has a dominant strategy which is to compete in taxes.
Proposition 4: Assume that governments maximize the income of low-income house-
holds in their jurisdictions. Then, in a subgame-perfect equilibrium, jurisdictions choose to
chooses transfers, the ﬁrst-order condition is (16) multiplied by dTi=dzijdaj=0, a 2 fT;zg. The term is given
by the inverse of (9) and (12), respectively. Straightforwardly, policy incentives are identical for a given choice
of jurisdiction j’s policy variable.
15Note, part (i) of Proposition 1 continues to hold, see footnote 14. Hence, jurisdiction j’s policy incentives
only depend on the choice of the neighbor’s policy variable and not on its own choice.
15compete in taxes.
The equilibrium prediction of Proposition 4 is identical to the ﬁnding in Proposition 2.
However, the economic incentives underlying the results are diametrically diﬀerent. They
are diﬀerent both in terms of the spill-over that a switch in a jurisdiction’s policy variable
exerts on the neighboring jurisdiction and how the neighbor’s policy response spills back to
the switching jurisdiction. The common starting point for the two results is that, when juris-
diction i chooses to set taxes strategically instead of transfers, then jurisdiction j conjectures
that less migrants will come following a rise in its transfers. The reason is that jurisdiction
i will raise its transfers as well which keeps some of the low-income households, that would
otherwise migrate, in jurisdiction i. Jurisdiction j welcomes the reduced migration response
provided it seeks to advance the interest of low-income households, just because migration
depresses the wage income of low-income households. Tax-transfer policy becomes more
beneﬁcial, with the consequence that jurisdiction j will choose higher transfers. The policy
change spills back to jurisdiction i. Less households will migrate to jurisdiction i in response
to the higher transfer in jurisdiction j. This raises the income of low-income households and,
thus, jurisdiction i beneﬁts from using taxes as the strategic variable. A reversed type of
reasoning applies when jurisdiction j promotes the interest of high-income households. In
this case, jurisdiction j’s transfer payments reduce when jurisdiction i chooses taxes strategi-
cally instead of transfers. The spill-back is beneﬁcial to jurisdiction i since the wage income
of high-income households rises with the level of migration. As such, the ﬁnal outcome is
independent of which income group the government favors, but the adjustments leading to
the outcome are opposite. The sensitivity of the structure of adjustments to the preference
of governments might also entail a diﬀerent equilibrium choice of policy variables, as shown
below.
5.2 Asymmetric government preferences
So far, we have assumed that the two governments have symmetric preferences, either both
favoring high-income or low-income households. Governments might equally pursue asym-
metric interests in the sense that one government targets low-income households while the
other government targets high-income households. We can readily analyze the equilibrium
choice of policy variables in the asymmetric setting with the help of the formal analysis and
16the taxonomy of the associated spill-overs and spill-backs that are explained above. Below, we
refrain from reiterating the formal analysis and resort to a verbal description of the interplay
of spill-overs and spill-backs to determine the equilibrium choice of policy variables.
Assume that jurisdiction i maximizes yh
i , while jurisdiction j maximizes yl
j. When juris-
diction i chooses taxes as a policy variable instead of transfers, then government j conjectures
that tax-transfer policy will lead to less migration to jurisdiction j. Since jurisdiction j rep-
resents the interest of low-income households, the less pronounced migration response is
beneﬁcial, just because it less strongly downward pressures the wage income of low-income
households. Incentives to provide transfers become stronger which spills back to jurisdiction i.
There, more low-income households emigrate which lowers the wage income of high-income
households in that jurisdiction. As such, choosing taxes as a policy variable reduces the
income of the government’s preferred household group. Interchanging the governments’ ob-
jectives and reiterating the line of reasoning shows that a government that pursues the interest
of low-income households also has no incentive to choose taxes as its policy variable. If it
so chooses, the neighboring jurisdiction will lower transfers which will negatively spill back.
Hence, both governments have a dominant strategy which is to compete in transfers. Thus,
Proposition 5: Assume that the two governments have asymmetric preferences in the
sense that one government maximizes the income of low-income households while the other
government maximizes the income of high-income households. Then, in a subgame-perfect
equilibrium, jurisdictions choose to compete in transfers.
The two jurisdictions have diﬀerent policy preferences and, in consequence, both the
spill-over and the spill-back that a jurisdiction triggers by a switch of its policy variable are
opposite in sign for the two jurisdictions. Interestingly, the opposite signs neutralize each
other in forming strategic incentives. Independently of their preferences, jurisdictions decide
to engage in transfer competition.
6 Discussion
The two forms of competition provide diﬀerent incentives to jurisdictions. This has implica-
tions for policies that an overarching institution, such as a federal government, might wish
17to choose and also for policies that a country might consider to implement unilaterally.
As a consequence of the diverging policy incentives, the inter-state externality of local
policy will diﬀer under the two regimes.16 To infer the diﬀerence in the externality and how
corrective policy by a federal government should respond to it, we determine how the sum
of household income in jurisdiction j, yh
j + ll
jyl
j, changes following a rise in zi. The focus on
aggregate income is for illustrative simplicity. The basic insight, that the Pigouvian grant
should be diﬀerently designed in both competition regimes, extends to other metrics that a
federal government might use to aggregate the interests of the two income groups.17










   
 





where a 2 fT;zg is the ﬁscal variable in which countries compete and, therefore, which is
held constant in jurisdiction j. A rise in the transfer level zi increases emigration from juris-
diction j which increases the market income of its low-income households.18 The externality
is felt diﬀerently in jurisdiction j under the two forms of competition. Recall from (11) that,
with tax competition, jurisdiction j’s transfer payments increase which keeps some the po-
tential migrants in the jurisdiction. The externality associated with the migration response
is less pronounced relative to transfer competition and so is the matching component of the
Pigouvian grant that the federal government devises for jurisdiction i.
In the absence of a central authority, jurisdictions may voluntarily pay transfers to other
jurisdictions in order to control the level of immigration. Jurisdictions may consider such a
policy beneﬁcial provided it alleviates the negative consequences of immigration for the public
budget and domestic wages. In our setting, there might be a rationale for unilateral transfer
16Policies also exert an intra-state externality on the income group that is not included in the government’s
objective function. As in the literature on ﬁscal federalism, we focus here on inter-jurisdictional externalities
and the proper federal corrective policy to address these.
17With inter-jurisdictional migration, the federal government might deny any demand for corrective policies.
This holds when the federal government only cares about the per-capita income of the mobile population in
jurisdiction j and the government in jurisdiction i also maximizes the per-capita income of the mobile household
in its jurisdiction. This might arise if, e.g., low-income households are mobile and the federal government is
Rawlsian. The two objectives are connected through the migration arbitrage condition w
l
1 + z1 = w
l
2 + z2
which ensures that the externality, as evaluated by the federal government, is zero. The result does not hold
when, e.g., the federal government cares about the total income of the mobile population in jurisdiction j or
when it cares about the income of immobile households as well. See Mansoorian and Myers (1997).
18The wage rates of high-income and low-income households adjust in opposite directions. The eﬀect on
total income cancels out with constant returns to scale in production.
18payments in situations in which the income of the mobile households enters the government
objective function since immigration lowers the wage income of low-income households. As
a necessary condition for voluntary transfers to deter immigration, the recipient government
has to spend the transfer in a way that keeps potential migrants in its jurisdiction. When
jurisdictions compete in taxes, the recipient government is conjectured to balance the bud-
get in response to a unilateral transfer payment by increasing income support for potential
migrants. Migration incentives are diluted, as intended by the voluntary transfer.19 Diﬀer-
ently, the donor jurisdiction conjectures the recipient jurisdiction to lower taxes on the rich,
immobile households when the two jurisdictions compete in transfers. Migration incentives
of households in the recipient jurisdiction remain unchanged. In consequence, a jurisdiction
will not ﬁnd it in its interest to voluntarily pay transfers in order to ‘purchase’ its preferred
ﬂow of migrants.
7 Concluding remarks
The economic eﬀects of migration and how governments should respond to them are preva-
lent policy issues in many developing and developed countries. In particular, governments
are tempted to strategically adjust their tax-transfer systems in order to inﬂuence migration
ﬂows in a beneﬁcial way. The paper sheds light on the way countries compete for migrants
by characterizing in which ﬁscal instrument such competition takes place. As it turns out,
governments will compete in taxes when they care about the same income type living in the
respective country. With asymmetric policy concerns, countries will compete in transfers
instead. Understanding the equilibrium mode of competition is helpful, e.g., in appropri-
ately designing federal corrective policies and in evaluating the eﬀectiveness of unilateral
‘migration-purchase’ policies, which are frequently observed in real-world policy making.
Our analysis can usefully be extended along several dimensions. For instance, one may
consider a richer set of policy instruments by including brain drain taxes in addition to
residence-based income taxes and transfer payments. The extension might be of particular
interest when studying migration from developing countries to developed countries.20 Also,
the degree of household mobility is exogenous. To endogenize the degree of mobility, one may
19Note, the positive income transfer adjustment is only a necessary condition for a donor country to pay
transfers voluntarily. See, e.g., Myers (1990) for a more detailed analysis of when donor countries make
transfers and recipient countries are also willing to accept them.
20Such a tax has been advocated by Baghwati (1972).
19focus on high-skilled migration and allow for investments in eduction that make households
mobile, as in Wildasin (2000). We leave these interesting extensions as well as other possible
extensions to future research.
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